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 ELD-043       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3244 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH CUNNINGHAM, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-00756) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 3, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 21, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Joseph Cunningham appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing 
his amended complaint against JP Morgan Chase Bank (hereinafter, “the Bank”).  There being 
no substantial question presented, we grant the Bank’s motion to summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
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 Cunningham’s complaint arises from a foreclosure action initiated by the Bank in the 
Delaware Superior Court.  At issue in that case is a mortgage executed by Joseph Cunningham, 
Sr., Cunningham’s deceased father.  Over five months after the Bank initiated the foreclosure 
case, Cunningham filed a rambling complaint in the District Court.  This complaint was a 
combination of discovery requests and an allegation that the Bank has committed fraud by 
concealing the satisfaction of the mortgage from the heirs of Cunningham’s father’s estate.  
The District Court dismissed his complaint without prejudice and provided him time within 
which to file an amended complaint. 
 Cunningham filed his amended complaint, again asserting various discovery requests 
and his fraud allegation.  His amended complaint appears to allege that the Bank’s fraudulent 
actions interfered with his ability to defend against the foreclosure, and he asked the District 
Court to enjoin the foreclosure action and award him $1 million in damages.  The District 
Court dismissed his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 
pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
1
  This 
appeal followed.
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1
 The Younger abstention doctrine “reflects a strong federal policy against federal-court 
interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”  
Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Under this doctrine, “federal courts must abstain in certain 
circumstances from exercising jurisdiction over a claim where resolution of that claim would 
interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.”  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
2
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over the 
legal determinations of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been met and, if 
so, we review the district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.”  FOCUS v. 
Allegheny Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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 We agree with the District Court that Younger abstention was appropriate in 
Cunningham’s case.  Such abstention is appropriate “only when: (1) there are ongoing state 
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state 
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.”  
Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 2009).  Here, the foreclosure action against 
Cunningham is ongoing in the Delaware Superior Court, and this proceeding implicates 
important state interests.  Finally, Cunningham has adequate opportunities to raise his fraud 
claim in state court.  Furthermore, Cunningham has not demonstrated “bad faith, harassment or 
some other extraordinary circumstance, which might make abstention inappropriate.”  Anthony 
v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by deciding to abstain.  Therefore, we grant the Bank’s motion for summary action 
and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
 
